Mebadi Uluslararası Felsefe Dergisi

Rational State: The Theory of Reasonable State and Virtuous Society

Nilüfer Karadağ — 2025-12-31

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Çevik's Rational State: The Theory of Reasonable State and Virtuous Society is an important source in the field of political philosophy. Throughout history, human beings have always lived in communities and have been guided by the tendencies of those communities. Leaders have also been trustworthy individuals who emerged from within society. However, the desire for power and conflicts of interest have, over time, distanced leaders from virtue and principles, making them inclined to ignore the fact that every citizen has the ability to think and to start making decisions that suit their own desires and interests. For people living in such a society, there arises a desire to become a rational society, centred on reason, away from interests or ideologies that are attempted to be imposed. Therefore, the intelligent person discussed in The State of Reason can be guided towards developing rational thinking skills. In a rational state, concepts such as rational religion, rational education, rational politics, rational law, rational diplomacy, rational economics, and rational nationalism gain greater importance. Çevik explains all the characteristics that should be present in a rational state within the framework of his Theory of Reasonable State, which he himself has developed. In this context, this work, which has been added to the academic literature as a new political theory, can be seen as an important contribution to the field.

The Secret of Hegel’s System: The Concrete Universal in Perspective

Shehzad Noor — 2025-12-31

Questions concerning the philosophical study of universals include: Is a universal a thing or not? Does it exist separately from our minds and the world of daily experience? Is it abstract or concrete? And is knowledge of the universal even possible? Understanding universals enable human thought and language grasp the world they live in. For this reason, philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and Kant, to name a few, have explored the existence, nature and function of universals. Considered indispensable, their knowledge is the very key to figuring out each philosopher’s system. For example, Plato’s separate world of universals, Aristotle’s participating universals within the apparent world as well as Kant’s universals, the mental categories of human knowledge and the unknown world of the thing-in-itself. This article aims to situate Hegel’s own view in dialogue with these earlier thinkers, in order to arrive at the analysis of the concrete universal. By doing so, it reveals the central key to Hegel’s philosophical system—one in which the universal is not static or abstract, but a singular, living and immanent reality that comes to know itself through the particulars it composes and contains.

Is It Possible to Understand John Rawls’s Theory of Justice Independently of Kantian Moral Foundations?

Tuba İlhan Dalar — 2025-12-31

The purpose of this article is to analyse the position of John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness vis-à-vis Kantian moral foundations. Rawls’s major work, A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971), is of interest not only in the field of political philosophy, but also in the debates over whether his position can be considered a Kantian. In this context, the paper begins by asking a crucial question: Is Rawls a Kantian or not? To answer this question, the paper delves deeply into a discussion of Rawls’s Kantian position, drawing extensively on secondary sources. These secondary sources are re-examined and classified for further evaluation, as they shed light on improving our understanding of Rawls’s views on Kant’s moral foundation. In particular, the relationship between Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness and the impact of Kant’s principal work, the Groundwork (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals), is discussed. The Kantian legacy becomes even more apparent in Rawls’s construction and testing of his principles of justice. These principles are considered as part of a thought experiment (the original position) behind a veil of ignorance. Especially in section §40 of TJ, Rawls’s Kantian interpretation regarding the genesis of the principles of justice as fairness determines the trajectory of this inquiry. While Rawls is clearly successful in linking the features of the person and justice as fairness to the Kantian categorical imperative and in establishing a parallel between the purely rational/autonomous person (in the Kantian sense) and the participant in the original position, a non-Kantian reading of TJ reveals some significant disagreements about the precise nature of Rawls’s Kantianism. Nevertheless, the relationship between Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness and its Kantian foundation remains a highly controversial issue among scholars. Therefore, this article aims to outline these disagreements between interpretations concerning Rawls’s intellectual debt to Kant.

A Meticulous Evaluation: Can We Really Think of Melayê Cizîrî As A Philosopher?

Merve Arslan — 2025-12-31

Melayê Cizîrî is one of the leading figures in 16th-century Sufi literature. Melayê Cizîrî's only known work, which explores the concepts of Islamic Sufism from a literary perspective and in poetic language, is the Diwan. The main theme of the Diwan is divine love. In connection with this central theme, the work also explores prophetic love in literary language. In exploring these themes, Melayê Cizîrî draws on sources of Sufi thought, such as Hallaj-i Mansur, Ibn Sina, Ibn Sab, and Ibn Arabi. Melayê Cizîrî's Diwan is currently being studied and interpreted from diverse perspectives in numerous fields, including history, philosophy, sociology, and astronomy. As Melayê Cizîrî uses some philosophical concepts in his work, some commentaries take his Diwan also as a philosophical work. How can we assess these interpretations?

With this urge, this study approaches Melayê Cizîrî's Diwan from a philosophical perspective. How and in what contexts does Melayê Cizîrî use philosophical concepts in Diwan? Which philosophical traditions are these concepts related to in the history of philosophy? How is the relationship of these concepts to the metaphysics of love established? Is Melayê Cizîrî's use of concepts consistent? In this case, how can we locate Melayê Cizîrî’s Diwan in the history of thought? Relying on these questions, this research aims to frame the philosophical concepts in Melayê Cizîrî’s work and to reassess his place in the history of thought.

The Femininity of Truth in Derrida’s Spurs

Canan Süslü — 2025-12-31

In his work Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles, Derrida puts into words an interpretation that provides a clue to the course of the discussion on the basic problem—namely, “what truth is” —that comes to the fore in Nietzsche’s text. In Spurs, he discusses the relation of truth to both the rational and emotional contexts, using the female image as the best example. The meanings and connotations he attributes to the female image—such as variability, unattainability, distance from authenticity, the inability to reach what should be, and the difficulty of defining a concrete truth—reflect the challenge of describing the impossibility of a constant form of truth within both technical discourse and intellectual-philosophical language. Truth cannot be attained through logical analysis alone, nor can it be attained wholly within the emotional context. Since the history of thought accepts the opposition and irreplaceability of reason and emotion, and bases the power of thought on this, the impossibility of reducing a situation containing two essentially opposing structures to a single definition and foundation determines the essence of the discussion. In that case, what do the multiple connotations and meanings of truth—discussed up to Nietzsche’s lifetime—correspond to in his female image? The possibility of this, whether in its literary, artistic, religious, or rational equivalents, will also refer to pluralistic connotations in Derrida’s analysis. This study argues that a single form cannot be fixed in terms of either language or art, and discusses Nietzsche’s “femininity of truth.”

A Critical Study of Quentin Meillassoux’s Resolution of Hume’s Problem

Emin Çelebi — 2025-12-31

This article examines Hume’s problem, which constitutes one of the foundational points of reference for Quentin Meillassoux’s speculative realism. It argues that while Meillassoux offers a largely compelling resolution of Hume’s problem up to a certain point, he ultimately reverses Hume’s position in the course of constructing his own theoretical framework. In order to substantiate this claim, the article first provides a general overview of Meillassoux’s philosophical project and explicates the manner in which he addresses Hume’s problem. It then proceeds to analyze the philosopher’s assessments in detail. Within this framework, and particularly when considered in light of the principle of non-contradiction, it is argued that Meillassoux’s account of “necessary contingency” does not amount to a substantive conceptual innovation, but rather remains at the level of a terminological reformulation.

The Meaning of Family: A Metaphysical and Metabiological Introduction

Mustafa Çevik — 2025-12-31

This study approaches the family not merely as a biological or sociological institution but as an ontological space grounded in the metaphysical and metabological foundations of human existence. The family constitutes the first place where the human being encounters the world, constructs meaning, develops moral intuitions, and forms an embodied and narrative sense of identity. Heidegger’s conception of space situates the family as the primary horizon of being-in-the-world, while Hegel’s theory of ethical life portrays it as the first communal unity grounded in love, trust, and reciprocity. Rawls’s model of moral development emphasizes that the sense of justice emerges initially within the family through stages of authority, cooperation, and principled reasoning.

Feminist critiques—especially those by Susan Moller Okin—illuminate how family structures may reproduce gender inequalities and shape distorted moral intuitions if they lack egalitarian foundations. Modern sociological perspectives further show that transformations in intimacy, the rise of individualization, and the fragility of contemporary relationships undermine the family’s role as a source of ontological security.

Drawn from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body, Buber’s relational ontology, Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity, and the attachment research of Bowlby and Fonagy, this study conceptualizes the family not only as a metaphysical domain but also as a neurobiological and affective matrix that shapes the foundations of trust, perception, and emotional understanding.

Ultimately, this work argues that the family must be understood beyond functionalist or reductionist biological approaches. It is presented as the originating space of human meaning, identity, moral reasoning, and existential grounding. The metaphysics and metabiology of the family reveal it as a constitutive environment for becoming human, transmitting values across generations, and cultivating the ontological security necessary for moral and social life.