Truth, Meaning, and Language in Frege and Nietzsche A Comparative Study

Abstract

This article explores the contrasting yet occasionally intersecting views of Gottlob Frege and Friedrich Nietzsche on language, meaning, and truth. While Frege is known for formalizing the logical structure of language and distinguishing between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung), Nietzsche develops a genealogical critique of truth, arguing that concepts are rooted in metaphor and conditioned by historical and psychological forces. Despite their opposing aims—Frege seeking semantic stability through logic, Nietzsche exposing the instability behind all linguistic claims—both thinkers challenge the assumption that language transparently reflects reality. They share an awareness of language’s mediating role in shaping thought, although they interpret its implications differently: Frege emphasizes logical objectivity and compositionality, while Nietzsche stresses perspectivism, interpretation, and the constructive force of metaphor. Through a comparative analysis, this paper highlights not only their diverging ontologies of language but also their shared recognition of the tension between language and reality. Ultimately, the dialogue between Frege’s analytic clarity and Nietzsche’s critical suspicion reveals two influential frameworks for understanding the limits of meaning and the nature of truth. By tracing both convergence and divergence in their accounts, this article contributes to a deeper understanding of contemporary debates on the epistemology of language and the foundations of philosophical semantics.