Is It Possible to Understand John Rawls’s Theory of Justice Independently of Kantian Moral Foundations?

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to analyse the position of John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness vis-à-vis Kantian moral foundations. Rawls’s major work, A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971), is of interest not only in the field of political philosophy, but also in the debates over whether his position can be considered a Kantian. In this context, the paper begins by asking a crucial question: Is Rawls a Kantian or not? To answer this question, the paper delves deeply into a discussion of Rawls’s Kantian position, drawing extensively on secondary sources. These secondary sources are re-examined and classified for further evaluation, as they shed light on improving our understanding of Rawls’s views on Kant’s moral foundation. In particular, the relationship between Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness and the impact of Kant’s principal work, the Groundwork (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals), is discussed. The Kantian legacy becomes even more apparent in Rawls’s construction and testing of his principles of justice. These principles are considered as part of a thought experiment (the original position) behind a veil of ignorance. Especially in section §40 of TJ, Rawls’s Kantian interpretation regarding the genesis of the principles of justice as fairness determines the trajectory of this inquiry. While Rawls is clearly successful in linking the features of the person and justice as fairness to the Kantian categorical imperative and in establishing a parallel between the purely rational/autonomous person (in the Kantian sense) and the participant in the original position, a non-Kantian reading of TJ reveals some significant disagreements about the precise nature of Rawls’s Kantianism. Nevertheless, the relationship between Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness and its Kantian foundation remains a highly controversial issue among scholars. Therefore, this article aims to outline these disagreements between interpretations concerning Rawls’s intellectual debt to Kant.