A Critical Study of Quentin Meillassoux’s Resolution of Hume’s Problem

Abstract

This article examines Hume’s problem, which constitutes one of the foundational points of reference for Quentin Meillassoux’s speculative realism. It argues that while Meillassoux offers a largely compelling resolution of Hume’s problem up to a certain point, he ultimately reverses Hume’s position in the course of constructing his own theoretical framework. In order to substantiate this claim, the article first provides a general overview of Meillassoux’s philosophical project and explicates the manner in which he addresses Hume’s problem. It then proceeds to analyze the philosopher’s assessments in detail. Within this framework, and particularly when considered in light of the principle of non-contradiction, it is argued that Meillassoux’s account of “necessary contingency” does not amount to a substantive conceptual innovation, but rather remains at the level of a terminological reformulation.